

China Mobile Hong Kong Company Limited

("CMHK")

Response to

**Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz Band upon
Expiry of the Existing Frequency Assignments for 3G Mobile Services**

- Second Consultation Paper

("the Second Consultation Paper")

Date of Submission: 11th April, 2013

CMHK would like to submit its views on the Second Consultation Paper issued by SCED and CA on 28th December, 2012.

All abbreviations have the same meaning as in the Consultation Paper.

Question 1: Do you agree that Slots 3, 4, 9 and 10 in the 1.9-2.2 GHz frequency band as depicted in Figure 1 should be put out for re-auction?

CMHK: we agree that Slots 3, 4, 9 and 10 in the 1.9-2.2 GHz frequency band as depicted in Figure 1 should be put out for re-auction.

Question 2: What are your views on setting the SUF of the RFR Spectrum in accordance with the market-based mechanism as proposed in the First and Second Methods for consultation as outlined in paragraphs 56-60 above?

CMHK: as submitted in our submissions dated 13th July, 2012 and reiterated in paragraph 10 of our supplemental submissions dated 30th July, 2012, the SUF should reflect the market price and this shall be determined through auctioning process.

In light of the above, we have reservations on the proposed First and Second Methods in that both of them make reference to the fee payable by the incumbent operators for the use of spectrum in the past years and such historical fees may not accurately reflect the true market value of the RFR Spectrum as at the date of auction. On this basis, we propose that the SUF for RFR Spectrum shall only make reference to the SUF of the Re-auctioned Spectrum as determined by auction.

Question 3: Do you agree that the Re-auctioned Spectrum should be open for bidding by all interested parties, including the incumbent 3G operators?

CMHK: We support that all interested parties shall be entitled to bid for the Re-auctioned Spectrum as this is in line with the principle of fairness that we have been upholding.

Question 4: What are your views on setting the auction reserve price at a relatively high level in order to forestall bid shading behaviour?

CMHK: We proposed that the reserve price of the Re-auctioned Spectrum shall be set at HK\$50 million for each block of 5MHz frequency band and then let the auction process determine the fair market price of such frequency band.

Question 5: Do you have any views on the proposed SMRA auction format?

CMHK: we note that under the existing arrangements, the auctioneer has the authority to set and adjust the Round Price for each frequency band in each round of bidding at its discretion as it thinks fit. This renders the Round Price in each round not predictable to the bidders and makes it difficult for the bidders to formulate its strategy in the whole bidding process. Accordingly, CMHK proposes that the Round Price for each round of bidding shall be made consistent and prior notice of that Round Price shall be made known to the bidders.

Question 6: Do you agree that there should be no spectrum cap imposed if all the incumbent 3G operators exercise the right of first refusal to acquire two-thirds of their original frequency holding and 2 x 20 MHz of spectrum will be put out for re-auction?

CMHK: in the above scenario, we propose that a cap of 2 x 20 MHz of spectrum shall be imposed (i.e. each successful bidder shall hold a maximum of 2 x 20MHz spectrum and, in case of the incumbent operators, such 2 x 20MHz shall be inclusive of their original frequency holding). This is to ensure fair competition by enabling new entrant(s) to get reasonably adequate spectrum.

Question 7: Do you agree that a spectrum cap should be imposed if the amount of spectrum to be put out for re-auction amounts to 2 x 40 MHz or more with some of the incumbent 3G operators deciding not to exercise the right of first refusal?

CMHK: Same views as expressed in our answer to question 6 above.

Conclusion: CMHK's stance as more particularly detailed in its submissions and supplemental submissions dated 13th and 30th July, 2012 respectively as well as its submissions made to the Legislative Council dated 27th March, 2013 are hereby reiterated and the said submissions are re-attached herewith as Annex 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

Annex 1

China Mobile Hong Kong Company Limited

("CMHK")

Response to

**Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz Band upon
Expiry of the Existing Frequency Assignments for 3G Mobile Services**

("Consultation Paper")

Date of Submission: 13th July, 2012

CMHK would like to submit its views on the Consultation Paper issued by OFTA on 30 March, 2012.

All abbreviations have the same meaning as in the Consultation Paper.

Question 1: Given there is clear indication of competing demand for the 3G spectrum, are there good public policy reasons for the TA to adopt Option 1, instead of the market-based approach as stipulated in the Framework, when the current 3G frequency assignments expire in October 2016?

CMHK takes the view that there are no good public policy reasons (let alone overriding public policy reasons which are the requirements under the Spectrum Policy Framework of 2007) for the TA to adopt Option 1. Spectrum remains a scarce resource and there are competing demands. Also, it may not be conducive to the efficient use of spectrum as new players will be precluded.

In addition, the 3G incumbent operators should have been well aware that, under the Spectrum Policy Framework of 2007, there is no legitimate expectation on the part of the licensees that there will be any right of renewal or right of first refusal of any licence or frequency assignment upon the expiry of a licence or frequency assignment. In light of the foregoing, it should have been within the contemplation of the incumbent 3G operators and should be within their business plan that there is a real risk that their licence or spectrum may not be renewed. Accordingly, disruption to continuity of customer service should not be a convincing reason for the incumbent 3G operators and not be a valid ground for the TA to adopt Option 1.

Question 2: In offering the right of first refusal to the incumbent 3G operators to acquire the 1.9 – 2.2 GHz spectrum under Option 1, what would be the preferred method for setting the SUF so that it may reflect the full market value of the spectrum?

To protect the scarce resources, CMHK takes the view that auction would be the preferred method for setting the SUF which will best reflect the market price. A case in point is the spectrum auction in March 2011 in which each of SmarTone and Hutchison successfully obtained 5 MHz x 2 bandwidth at SUF of HK\$875 million and HK\$1,077 million respectively.

From our perspective, SUF set by administrative means may not be able to truly reflect the market situation.

Question 3: How would the prospect to re-auction the entire 120MHz of spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz band impact on the investment plan and network planning of the incumbent 3G operators, and how would that further impact on their mobile network capacity?

CMHK takes the view that it is unlikely that such re-auction would have any great impact on the investment plan and network planning of the incumbent 3G operators. The reason being that, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the incumbent 3G operators shall have been well aware that they may not be able to retain their existing spectrum upon expiry of the current term.

Question 4: The number of players in the mobile telecommunications market may or may not remain unchanged after the auction. Would competition in the mobile market be enhanced if the entire 120 MHz of spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz band is to be re-auctioned under Option 2?

CMHK agrees that competition in the mobile market would be greatly enhanced if the entire 120 MHz of spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz band is to be re-auctioned under Option 2. As mentioned by OFCA in para. 34 of this consultation paper, the market mechanism will ensure that the successful bidders which value the spectrum the most will obtain the spectrum by paying the highest SUF, and as a result they will put the spectrum to the most productive uses. In other words, even if the number of players may remain unchanged if the entire band is to be re-auctioned under Option 2, market forces will make the successful bidders to put the spectrum to the most productive users, thereby enhancing competition in the mobile market.

Question 5: What would be the transitional plans for an incumbent 3G operator if under Option 2(a) it cannot retain any of its original frequency assignment; (b) it can retain only part of its original frequency assignment; and (c) it gets spectrum in a different sub-frequency band?

CMHK foresees that the incumbent 3G operators will move their existing 3G traffic to their other frequency spectrum in order to ensure continuance of services. Also, the current regulatory regime allows those operators with 900 MHz spectrum to re-farm such spectrum for 3G services, if they so

wish, under the current terms and conditions of their existing licences.

Question 6: What are the estimated costs and the areas of investment for implementing the transitional plans for tackling the three scenarios mentioned in Question 5?

CMHK has no comments as CMHK has no information about this.

Question 7: If an incumbent 3G operator is unable to obtain any of the 3G spectrum or if it manages to obtain less spectrum than what it currently has, to what extent the spectrum that it currently holds in other frequency bands could act as effective substitute for the spectrum foregone?

CMHK takes the view that the spectrum that the incumbent 3G operators hold in other frequency bands could act as effective substitute for the spectrum foregone.

Question 8: How effective would be the application of alternative technologies (e.g. Wi-Fi, femtocell, etc) help economise on the use of radio spectrum through offloading the mobile data traffic?

CMHK agrees that such alternative technologies would be very effective to help economise on the use of radio spectrum through offloading the mobile data traffic. Indeed, wi-fi is a very mature technology which is being provided by government in various places as well as by some incumbent 3G operators.

Question 9: Do you have any comment on the preliminary proposal of the TA to offer each of the incumbent 3G operators the right of first refusal to a frequency assignment of 2 x 10 MHz of 3G spectrum post October 2016 under Option 3?

CMHK does not have any view on this since CMHK does not opt for Option 3.

Question 10: Similar to Question 1, given there is clear indication of competing demand for the 3G spectrum, are there good public policy reasons for the TA to offer Spectrum RFR to the incumbent 3G operators, instead of assigning it through the

market-based approach as stipulated in the Framework, when the current 3G frequency assignments expire in October 2016?

CMHK takes the same position as expressed in its response to Question 1 above.

Question 11: Do you have any comment on the preliminary proposal of the TA under Option 3 to devise an arrangement so that all interested parties will have the opportunity to get hold of at least a contiguous band of 2 x 10 MHz of paired 3G spectrum?

Although CMHK does not opt for Option 3, however, purely from technical perspective, such a proposal of making sure that all interested parties will have the chance to get hold of at least a contiguous band of 2 x 10MHz of paired 3G spectrum is acceptable. If Option 2 is to be adopted, CMHK opines that the same arrangement shall apply, i.e. there must be at least a contiguous band of 2 x 10 MHz of paired 3G spectrum for each interested party in order to ensure efficient use.

Question 12: Taking into account the merits of having contiguous spectrum of 2 x 10 MHz paired spectrum and the investment in capital equipment that the incumbent operators have already put in the 3G spectrum, should the TA draw up the band plan as described in paragraph 46?

CMHK supports the idea that TA should draw up the band plan.

Question 13: What are your views and comments on the proposed arrangement discussed in paragraph 54?

CMHK does not support the proposed arrangement as the price shall be based on the auctioned price in order to reflect the true market price.

Question 14: What are your views and comments on the proposal to benchmark the SUF of Spectrum RFR with the Spectrum Re-auctioned as proposed in paragraphs 55-58 above?

Although CMHK does not support option 3, CMHK supports the idea that any SUF shall be

determined through auction in order to reflect the true market value.

Question 15: What are your views on the proposal to put the unpaired 3G spectrum to reserve?

CMHK supports the idea.

Annex 2

China Mobile Hong Kong Company Limited
("CMHK")

Supplemental Submissions

on

**Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9-2.2 GHz Band upon
Expiry of the Existing Frequency Assignments for 3G Mobile Services**

("Consultation Paper")

Date of Submission: 30th July, 2012

In response to the Consultation Paper dated 30th March, 12 for Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9 – 2.2 GHz Band upon Expiry of the Existing Frequency Assignments for 3G Mobile Services ("the Consultation Paper"), we made our submissions on 13th July, 2012 ("Submissions"). Now, we would like to further supplement our Submissions as follows.

1. Option 1 proposed that first right of refusal be given to the incumbent 3G operators upon expiry of the term of licence of 3G spectrum. We submit that such first right of refusal is at odds with the market-based approach.
2. As mentioned in our Submissions, there are no good policy reasons to deviate from the market-based approach in spectrum management as enshrined in the Radio Spectrum Policy Framework of April, 2007 ("the Framework"), let alone overriding public policy reasons which are the specific requirements under the Framework. We would emphasize that "overriding" public policy reasons is a much higher standard than simply "good" public policy reasons.

General principle of fairness

3. Spectrum is a national resource that needs to be managed in the public interest. Indeed, as recognised by CA in the Consultation Paper, *"spectrum remains a scarce public resource."* (para. 10) and *"the amount of 3G spectrum under review in this consultation exercise accounts for as much as about one-quarter of the total spectrum currently assigned for the provision of public mobile services. Furthermore, there will be no supply of new spectrum suitable for the provision of mobile services until the analogue TV service is switched off, which is targeted to be at end 2015."* (para. 11)
4. In light of the huge quantum of scarce spectrum is at stake here, public interest requires that, for the sake of fairness, the spectrum concerned shall be open to auction by all interested parties. In order to uphold this principle of fairness, it is of utmost importance that all interested parties shall be given an equal and fair chance to obtain such spectrum. If Option 1 is adopted, such core values of fairness and equal chance to participation will definitely be totally destroyed.
5. If there is any unfairness in spectrum management, it will easily be open to accusation by the public as collusion between government and business conglomerates. In particular, shareholders of all the incumbent 3G operators are commercial conglomerates in Hong Kong. Allowing them to continue to renew their current spectrum assignment without going

through an open re-auctioning process will easily be seen as transfer of interests from the government to particular commercial groups. From another angle, we are concerned that the government will be seen as protecting the vested interests of the business conglomerates. At such time when public sentiment is very sensitive about such transfer of interests to commercial conglomerates, such suspicion of collusion and transmission of interests can be avoided by way of opening the current 3G spectrum to all interested parties to bid. Violation of the above basic core value will probably be a cause for judicial review which will further create uncertainties for the entire spectrum assignment exercise.

6. While there may be arguments that new players can enter the market by way of MVNOs, merger and acquisitions or auctioning of other spectrum, this cannot resolve the basic issues of unfairness. Why should an interested party be denied of the chance to bid for the spectrum concerned while allowing the incumbent 3G operators to keep their existing spectrum without going through the bidding process? Under Article 118 of the Basic Law, it stipulates that "*The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide an economic and legal environment for encouraging investments, technological progress and the development of new industries.*" Depriving an interested party of the chance to bid for the spectrum (and thereafter investment) is a clear violation of the above article in that the environment so created does not encourage investments or technological progress. It is the major mission and task of CA to create a level playing field so that all interested parties can compete for the concerned spectrum.

Efficient spectrum utilization

7. There may be argument that Hong Kong telecommunications market is competitive enough and there is no need to introduce further entrants in order to enhance competition. Such argument is anti-competitive and we take the view that we should let the market decide the number of players and should not arbitrarily limit the number of players in the market. CA has also casted doubt in paras. 20 and 21 of the Consultation Paper in that it is "*not certain whether the existing assignment of the 120 MHz of 1.9 – 2.2 GHz spectrum among the four incumbent 3G operators has already delivered the optimal consumer benefit...In addition, the amount and profile of spectrum holding is highly asymmetric among the five MNOs.*" Hence, CA concluded that "*It may be possible to attain higher spectral efficiency for the industry as a whole by varying the distribution of the spectrum among incumbent 3G operators or by recruiting new players to the 3G mobile service market.*" We fully support and agree with the above conclusion.

8. In any event, given the re-farming technology and the trend of migrating services and customers to 4G spectrum, we cast doubt on whether it is still necessary for the incumbent 3G operators to keep 15MHz x 2 in order to maintain their services in the coming years.
9. If Option 3 is adopted (which we do not prefer), we would suggest that each incumbent 3G operator be requested to free up 5MHz from its current 15MHz spectrum in such a way that a contiguous band of 10 MHz spectrum (i.e. 5 MHz plus the next 5MHz which is adjacent to it) can be put up for auction. This has the merit of supporting dual carrier design for good performance and optimizing the utilisation of frequency assignments.
10. In respect of calculation method of SUF, we take the view that the above fairness principle shall also apply. We maintain our view, as mentioned in the Submissions, that the SUF shall reflect the market price and this shall be determined through auctioning process. We agree with CA's postulation in para. 34 of the Consultation Paper that the "market mechanism will ensure that the successful bidders which value the spectrum the most will obtain the spectrum by paying the highest SUF, and as a result they will put the spectrum to the most productive uses". The incumbent operators may be inclined to postulate that SUF shall be minimal or even free. We disagree with such postulation as we strongly believe that only market price will drive the operators to utilize their spectrum efficiently in order to stay competitive and maximize their return on investment.
11. Also, such auctioning process will ensure an appropriate financial return to the taxpayer. In Australia, even though they have taken the renewal approach, it was also expected to raise approximately \$3 billion over the next four years from the renewal fees. (http://www.minister.dpcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2012/015) Those proposing renewal under Option 1 but at the same time attempting to ask for not paying the market price are trying to get the best of both worlds.
12. As a whole, Option 1 may only be justifiable when there is no competing demand for the spectrum in question but this is clearly not the case in Hong Kong as evidenced by CA's findings that "Other than the four incumbent 3G operators, other parties have expressed strong interest in the relevant spectrum." (para. 12 of the Consultation Paper)
13. Option 3 has been tainted with the element of right of first refusal and, hence, we do not prefer that.

Impact on incumbent operators

14. If the re-auction process under Option 1 has impact on the investment plan and network planning of incumbent operators, these operators should have foreseen and subsequently planned long time ago the possible consequences upon expiry.
15. We would reiterate that, as early as 2007, it has been within the contemplation of the incumbent 3G operators that their licence of use of 3G spectrum may not be renewed upon expiry of term which was clearly stated in the Framework (para. 4.2). This shall not be used as an excuse now that the proposed auctioning process will deter investment and innovation. Nor is it responsible to allege that Options 2 and 3 will cause such high uncertainties.
16. In any event, if it is decided next year (i.e. in Oct. 2013) that the current spectrum assignment will not be renewed and shall be re-auctioned in 2016, the Incumbent 3G operators will still have at least 3 years to prepare their investment and network plans.
17. Some incumbent 3G operators may lose a portion or all of their frequency assignments but some of them may be able to acquire more spectrum than what they currently have. If the incumbent 3G operators are keen to further invest, Option 2 is the best opportunity for them to get more spectrum.
18. There may be arguments that at the end of the auction (be it under Option 2 or Option 3), some operators may be assigned with spectrums which are different from their current ones, thereby incurring additional operational works and difficulties. To overcome this, we would suggest that those Incumbent 3G operators who got a different spectrum may swap it with others to keep the existing spectrum in order to minimize the need for change of equipment. We appreciate such issues and would suggest that OFCA may perform a co-ordinating role in order to minimize the potential impact on the operators concerned.
19. Considering that such spectrum expiry issue is not new, the incumbent 3G operators should have contingency plans in place to minimize the potential impact caused to customers. For instance, prepare plans to migrate customers to their other spectrum just in case they cannot retain their current spectrum.
20. Be it under Option 2 or 3, there may be issue of offloading of traffic to other spectrum. We note that some operators have already re-farmed their spectrum from GSM to 3G or LTE. Consequently, 3G users should be able to enjoy 3G & 4G network services in other spectrum. In other words, 3G network is still retained and 4G already acts as an off-loader

to 3G. The need to retain existing 2.1GHz 3G spectrum has become less significant from technical's perspective. On the other hand, with more 2.6 GHz spectrum auction, more spectrum can be used for 4G and hence customer shift from 3G to 4G has become a viable solution.

21. As rightly pointed by CA in para. 39 of the Consultation Paper, however complicated the process may sound, it can be argued that such a concern is exactly what the market-based approach is supposed to deal with.

Continuity of service

22. In any event, even if Option 1 is adopted, there is no guarantee that the incumbent 3G operators will exercise such rights as it will be "*subject to their payment of the SUF to be specified by SCED and agreement to the licence conditions to be imposed by the TA.*" (para. 17 of the Consultation Paper). On this point, we would like to add that such factors as the general economic climate and other factors such as business decisions of the incumbent 3G operators concerned at the time of expiry will also be critical to the incumbent 3G operators in making their decision. In a word, service continuity will probably be assured only if the incumbent 3G operators all exercise the right of first refusal to retain their original frequency assignment after Oct. 2016.

23. In addition, our above submissions regarding offloading of traffic will also help to ease the concerns on possible impact on service continuity if Option 1 is not adopted.

Encouragement of investment and promotion of innovative services

24. In para. 19 of the Consultation Paper, CA took the assumption that "*With this certainty in the spectrum assignment for another 15 years, there is little reason for them to hold back on their investment in the 1.9 – 2.2 GHz frequency band.*" On this point, we would like to add that continuous investment will be affected by such other factors as general economic environment at the relevant time and the specific business decision of the incumbent 3G operators. In other words, there is no guarantee that the incumbent 3G operators will continue to invest and innovate even if Option1 is adopted. In particular and as submitted above, considering the trend towards migrating services and customers to 4G, it is doubtful if the incumbent 3G operators will continue to invest in their current 3G network in the years to come. The risk of uncertainties remains.

Impact on customers

25. There are some arguments that Option 2 will adversely affect service continuity. As mentioned above, the incumbent 3G operators will have at least 3 years to plan ahead before expiry of their licence of use of spectrum. Considering that the general contract term of a mobile customer is about 2 years, it is unlikely that the customers will be adversely affected if the incumbent 3G operators can plan in advance now.
26. Also, as submitted above, there is no guarantee that the incumbent 3G operators will exercise their first right of refusal even if Option 1 is adopted. Hence, the risk of disruption to continuity of customers' services remains.
27. From another angle, customers shall not be denied of the choice of new entrants in the market which will bring them more quality and innovative services. In our case, CMHK has a customer base of [X] which occupies a large part of Hong Kong population. If CMHK is able to obtain 3G spectrum, it can much improve its services by bridging the gap between its 2G and 4G services. In other words, a total of [X] customers can benefit from this spectrum re-auctioning exercise.

- End -

Annex 3



中国移动通信
CHINA MOBILE

中國移動香港有限公司關於《在第三代流動服務現有頻率指配到期後 有關1.9 - 2.2 吉赫頻帶頻譜的安排》的意見

有關香港政府與通訊事務局就 1.9 - 2.2 吉赫頻譜(下稱“3G 頻譜”)的使用權期滿後安排及其他 3G 網絡商就此事項提出的意見，中國移動香港有限公司(下稱“中移香港”)希望藉此機會表達我們的立場及看法。

一． 中移香港的立場

無線電頻譜是有限及珍貴的公共資源，所以在管理時必須以公眾利益為前提，中移香港認為香港政府必須有一套公平及公開的頻譜分配機制。

中移香港主張的公平及公開的頻譜分配機制，並不是要求所有流動網絡商平均分配無線電頻譜。我們的訴求是一個公平公正的機制，讓所有有興趣參與的人士，包括現有 3G 網絡商、其他的電訊網絡商及有意加入香港電訊市場的公司，享有平等的機會並以公開及由市場決定的價格去獲取有限及珍貴的公共資源。所以，我們重申所有使用權期滿的 3G 頻譜應重新拍賣。



中国移动通信
CHINA MOBILE

有論據認為新的競爭者可以通過虛擬網絡營運商（下稱“MVNO”）、併購或拍賣其他頻譜的方式進入市場，但這並不能解決市場不公平的基本問題。根據《基本法》第 118 條規定：「香港特別行政區政府提供經濟和法律環境，鼓勵各項投資、技術進步並開發新興產業。」剝奪有興趣者競投頻譜（及以後的投資）的機會，這不是鼓勵投資或技術進步，亦明顯違反了《基本法》中要求創造的環境。創造公平競爭的環境是通訊事務管理局的主要任務，有興趣者都應該有享有同等的機會競投有關頻譜。而現時擁有 3G 頻譜的網絡商，亦可按其需要，用市場價格競投更多的頻譜。

我們深信公平及公開的機制和自由的市場競爭，是香港市民認同的核心價值。反觀，現有 3G 網絡商建議的自動續牌方案等同「世襲」，這非但不能讓珍貴的公共資源發揮最大的經濟效益，更加剝奪了其他有興趣人士參與的機會，窒礙市場的自由發展。

另有論據認為，香港電訊市場的競爭已經非常激烈，沒有必要再加入新的網絡商以加強競爭。這種說法是反競爭的。我們認為應該讓市場來決定競爭者的數量，而不應該強制地限制市場上的網絡商數量。

二． 重新拍賣頻譜，不等如失去頻譜

近期，有評論指出重新拍賣頻譜是「迫使」現時 3G 網絡商交出三分之一的頻譜，我們希望重申頻譜拍賣的機制是能夠為市場上所有有興趣參與的人士提供公平公正獲取頻譜的機會，包括現有的 3G 網絡商均可以以市場決定的價格獲得其所需的頻譜。現有的 3G 網絡商甚至有機會獲得更多的頻譜資源。

我們認為，任何流動網絡商希望保留其持有的公共頻譜資源但又不願意付出由市場決定的價格，是不切實際的想法，同時也不符合公眾利益的原則。我們堅信只有通過由市場決定的價格才可以推動網絡商更好，更有效地利用其頻譜資源。

三． 如中移香港持有的頻譜是「充裕」，其他網絡商持有的頻譜是否「過剩」

有評論指出中移香港已持有「充裕」的頻譜。我們可以從實際數字去考證這個論點是否正確。從表一可見各網絡商現時持有的頻譜數量，中移香港擁有的頻譜僅略高於其中一家流動網絡商，其餘三家網絡商持有的頻譜較我們多出 12%-43%，由此已清楚說明有關評論與事實不符。



中国移动通信
CHINA MOBILE

表一：現時流動通訊頻譜分配

網絡商	持有頻譜 ¹
香港移動通訊	137.6MHz
和記電話 ²	134.4MHz
數碼通	107.6MHz
中移香港	96.4MHz
香港電訊 ²	96.0MHz

備註：

¹ 包括剛於 2013 年 3 月 19 日完成拍賣的頻譜；

² 和記電話及香港電訊以合營公司 Genius Brand 共同持有的頻譜，各以 50：50 形式計算

事實上，現時市場上有不少的流動網絡商將其網絡租用予其他的 MVNO，這已充分顯示其他 3G 流動網絡商持有過剩的頻譜資源。



中国移动通信
CHINA MOBILE

四． 重新拍賣頻譜會帶來更多投資及增加就業機會

有評論表示，假如現有的 3G 網絡商於公開拍賣中落敗，將失去其繼續大量投資的動力。我們認為重新拍賣頻譜，可以為現在有需要網絡商提供機會，獲取更多頻譜，從而投放更多資源發展網絡；若由新的投資者取得頻譜，更會建設新的網絡，為市場帶來更多新的就業機會，為香港整體經濟及勞工市場帶來正面的效果。

五． 公平開放的市場才能為消費者帶來最大的益處

有評論指出，以價高者得的方法重新拍賣頻譜將會大幅增加現有網絡商的成本，有可能導致消費者需要繳付更高服務費用。事實上，頻譜的使用費只是網絡商營運成本的一部份，頻譜的拍賣支出與服務費用的調整沒有必然關係。

我們可以從過去頻譜拍賣結果，分析高昂的拍賣價格是否必定為市場帶來更高服務收費。例如：在 2011 年 3 月完成的 850 及 900 兆赫頻譜拍賣，兩家網絡商分別以港幣 8.75 億及 10.77 億的高價，各取得 10 兆赫的 3G 頻譜，然而，整體市場的流動服務收費在有競爭的市場環境下，仍然持續下調。



回顧香港的電訊市場，引入自由競爭，不單沒有引致價格上升，反而藉著更多網絡商的參與，增加投資，讓市民以相宜的收費享用更優質及創新的服務，最終讓消費者得益。